Confused Over the Debate of whether Canada needs a Foreign Intelligence Agency? You’re not alone!

The debate regarding whether Canada should have a separate Foreign Intelligence Service/Agency has been a recurring topic of debate in 2023. And with good reason! A quick look back on some of this year’s news headlines has given many Canadians reason to question if enough is being done by the Canadian Intelligence Community to ensure the security and future prosperity of the country.

From the PM accusations regarding the Indian Governments involvement in the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar outside a temple in Surrey, B.C., to allegations of foreign influence in the electoral process, to accusations that Michael Spavor endangered the life of Michael Kovrig over information regarding North Korea, Canadians have had more to consider about our national security, and the collection of intelligence outside of Canada, in the last year than they have since 9/11.

Back in June, I wrote an article in the blog section of Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, entitled “What’s a Game without Offence?”. In the article, I likened intelligence operations to a sporting match, highlighting the stark difference between defensive security intelligence and the crucial need for offensive Foreign Intelligence. It also underscored the disadvantages Canada faces within the Five Eyes alliance due to the absence of a dedicated HUMINT Foreign Intelligence Agency—emphasizing the impact on specialized capabilities, strategic influence, international operations, and proactive intelligence gathering.

But since writing that article, I have come to the realization that there are several issues surrounding the Foreign Intelligence Agency for Canada debate, including:

• The overwhelming confusion surrounding what Canada currently does regarding foreign intelligence collection.
• What the meaning of “Foreign Intelligence” is compared to “Security Intelligence”.
• How Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) differs from Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

I am empathetic with the Canadian public concerning these issues and definitions. They are complex, nebulous, and often misused by the media, government and sometimes even Intelligence professionals themselves.

In a scene from the 2015 hit movie “The Big Short,” Margo Robbie, sitting in a bubble bath and sipping sparkling wine, casually explains confusing terms relating to finance. Just before this scene starts, Ryan Gosling (a good Canadian gent) narrates the following: “…mortgage-backed securities, subprime loans, tranches. It’s pretty confusing right! Does it make you feel bored, or stupid? Well, it’s supposed to. Wall Street loves to use confusing terms to make you think only they can do what they do. Or even better, for you just to leave them the @!&% alone. So, here’s Margo Robbie in a bubble bath to explain.”

This scene provides a good analogy for the confusion relating to foreign intelligence and its collection. Many may feel overwhelmed by the terms and think that the Government of Canada just wants to be left alone to make (or not make) decisions on this topic as they feel fit.

But just like your financial future and success, the safety, financial, political and military future of Canada is dependent on Canadians understanding the terms and issues surrounding Foreign Intelligence collection. If you aren’t clear on the terms and issues, you won’t be able to decide whether the current collection of Foreign Intelligence is being utilized to its fullest effect for a safe and prosperous future.

Unfortunately, Margo Robbie had a scheduling conflict and couldn’t film herself in a bathtub explaining Foreign Intelligence collection, the surrounding terms, and issues. (I’ll keep asking though.)

So instead, I will attempt to provide a better understanding of these definitions, with the goal of enabling you to make a more informed decision on whether a Foreign Intelligence Agency is important to Canada’s security and prosperity.

Additionally, I will address some of the possible advantages of a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency, and some concerns that should be addressed before such an organization is brought to life via the enactment of Parliamentary decisions.

Here we go:

Agency vs. Service (a rose by any other name…)

From a global perspective, the terms “Intelligence Services” and “Agencies” are often used interchangeably, and the nuanced differences are influenced more by historical context and operational scope than by any naming priorities.

However, Services traditionally focus on domestic security intelligence within a nation’s borders, dealing with counterintelligence and internal security.

Alternately, Agencies tend to handle broader functions including foreign intelligence, covert operations, and policy implementation.

Doesn’t Canada already have a Foreign Intelligence entity?

The answer is yes, kinda. The Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, has the following information clearly stated on its official website:

“CSE is the Government of Canada’s foreign signals intelligence agency.
We alert the government to the activities of foreign entities that seek to undermine Canada’s national prosperity and security.”

CSE is a SIGINT organization. They collect—through interception of all forms of communications like conversations, texts, emails and more—information that can be analyzed, corroborated, assessed, and verified so it can be used by the Government of Canada to make decisions regarding Canada’s security and prosperity.

This leads us to the obvious question: If Canada has CSE, why would we need another foreign service or agency?

Unfortunately, SIGINT, like all forms of intelligence collection, has its limitations. Specifically, SIGINT may be lacking in context, and electronic devices or interceptions cannot be tasked or directed (definitions forthcoming) to find specific information or provide insight or estimation.

For example, an exchange between two or more people can have an entirely different meaning if the outside observer does not understand the context in which the messages were intended. Were they sent in jest? Who were the actual sender and recipient? If someone uses my phone to text someone else, how would anyone know it wasn’t me? You can see how SIGINT has some inherent ambiguities.

This is where HUMINT comes in.

SIGINT vs. HUMINT

HUMINT, by contrast, allows for follow-up questions to be posed to a source of information (a person) that can potentially lead into new avenues of information collection. Human sources can explain the information they are providing with a level of context that may not be achievable through SIGINT alone.

Why is this important? Well, if a Major-General from an enemy foreign state sends a vague message to a colleague stating “Soon, we will go ahead with the plan and they will pay severely” words like “soon,” “the plan,” “they,” and “pay severely” are either unknown or beholden to speculation. Conversely, if a human source is present during this exchange, they can provide the needed answers to these questions, creating context.

And what happens to conversations or communications that aren’t intercepted? For SIGINT, if it isn’t intercepted, it can’t be analyzed. However, a human source can be in a privileged position to overhear or be part of a conversation that was not intercepted electronically.

SIGINT, by its shear nature, cannot task or direct sources. Even individuals in the Intelligence Community get these terms confused or use them interchangeably.

Tasking
Tasking refers to the specific assignments or instructions given to intelligence operatives, agents, or sources regarding what information to gather or operations to conduct.

Tasking outlines the priorities, objectives, targets, or areas of interest that the intelligence agency wants its operatives or sources to focus on. Tasking focuses on specific goals for the collection of information.

• Example: An Intelligence Officer might task a human source in a foreign country to gather information about a specific military installation’s activities or to monitor the movements of a particular individual.

Direction
This term is used to describe the broad guidance or strategic oversight provided by intelligence organizations to ensure that HUMINT activities align with overarching intelligence priorities, policies, and national security objectives.

Direction encompasses an overall strategy, priorities, ethical guidelines, and legal boundaries within which intelligence collection activities are conducted.

• Example: The direction provided by a country’s intelligence priorities might emphasize the need for information on emerging technology trends in a rival nation, guiding multiple HUMINT operations to focus efforts on that specific area.

Through tasking and direction, a human source who has access to privileged or secret information can be utilized to collect information on various topics of concern or threats. When a new threat or area of concern is identified, the human source can be re-tasked and redirected to use their access or gain new access to the required information. This is not always the case for a device or an intercept.

This is not to undermine the advantages of SIGINT. As the world continues to rely more and more on digitally based communications, the requirement for SIGINT is essential and will continue to grow. However, the combination of SIGINT and HUMINT allows for more complete foreign intelligence collection.

Now that we have a better understanding of what foreign intelligence capacity Canada has, and the difference between SIGINT and HUMINT, let’s look at the definitions and differences relating to Security Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence.

Security Intelligence
Security Intelligence involves the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to identify and counter potential threats to national security.

In Canada, it involves the identification and investigation of threats related to various aspects of national security including terrorism, sabotage, foreign influence, subversion, and espionage.

Security Intelligence is typically collected within the boundaries of the country in which the Intelligence organization is lawfully entitled to act.

• Example: Tasking and directing sources to gather intelligence on potential terrorists, aiding in disrupting radicalization processes and identifying individuals involved in extremist networks.

Foreign Intelligence
Foreign Intelligence involves the collection of secret and sensitive information concerning the activities, intentions, capabilities, and behaviours of foreign entities including governments, organizations, or individuals.

The collection of Foreign Intelligence is to ensure the security and prosperity of the host country. This collection can include political decisions, economic strategies, military strategies, or technological advancements.

• Example: Cultivating sources abroad, to uncover and counter foreign operatives attempting to influence Canadian politics, media, or business, safeguarding against external manipulation, and protecting national interests.

Security Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence—Working Together

The importance of Security Intelligence to identify, investigate, and prevent national security threats from being perpetrated against Canada and Canadians is a relatively simple concept that most, if not all Canadians can get behind. A country must be safe and secure before considering the advantages of a prosperous economy, well equipped and prepared military, and a strong political presence on the world stage.

Much like the way SIGINT and HUMINT can complement one another in intelligence collection, Security Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence work to strengthen a country’s defences against not only national security threats within their country, but also threats outside of their borders that may or will have an impact on the security and prosperity of their country.

Additionally, a Foreign Intelligence Agency with HUMINT capacity can be a force multiplier for SIGINT collection.

As an example, let’s consider a recurring and increasing security and economic concern for Canada and Canadians—cyber-attacks. Cyber-attacks are a threat to our safety (through damaged or inoperable infrastructure), our security (through the hacking of our government and military institutions), and our economy (through ransomware and identity theft). A foreign intelligence agency with a HUMINT capability could work in cooperation with CSE to try to recruit, run or disrupt the activities of members of an enemy foreign state’s cyber operations group focussing attacks against Canada.

Considerations Surrounding the Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Agency

When a country like Canada—part of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—considers legislating a new foreign intelligence agency, several critical considerations should be considered:

1. Legal Framework and Oversight:
   o Legislation and Regulation: Canada would need to develop clear and comprehensive legislation outlining the agency’s mandate, powers, limitations, and accountability mechanisms. Fortunately, Canada can build upon its own experience in legislation regarding Intelligence Collection.
   o Oversight Mechanisms: Establishing robust oversight mechanisms ensures the agency operates within legal boundaries, respects privacy rights, and is accountable to the government and potentially to independent oversight bodies. Currently, the National Security Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is in place to work as an oversight body for a Foreign Intelligence Agency.
2. International Obligations and Alliances:
   o Alignment with Five Eyes: To maintain trust and cooperation with partner countries, the GOC would need to ensure that the Foreign Intelligence Agency’s operations align with the intelligence-sharing protocols, agreements, and standards set within the Five Eyes alliance. Australia, the UK, and the United States all have well-respected and effective Foreign Intelligence Services and Agencies.
   o Respect for International Laws: To avoid diplomatic friction or legal disputes, the GOC would also need to ensure that any Foreign Intelligence Agency’s activities comply with international laws, treaties, and conventions. Canada has always been considered a “rule of law” country, and this expectation would extend into any foreign operations by such an agency.
3. Technological Capabilities and Security:
   o Investment in Technology: There would be a great requirement to equip the Foreign Intelligence Agency with the necessary technological capabilities for effective intelligence gathering, cybersecurity and data protection, while ensuring measures to prevent abuse or unauthorized access to information. Canada can leverage the already extensive and capable resources of the Communications Security Establishment to help ensure a new Foreign Intelligence Agency is well-equipped and capable of HUMINT foreign intelligence collection.
   o Counterintelligence Measures: A Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency would be most vulnerable at its inception. Therefore, to prevent sensitive information from being compromised, there would be a strong requirement to develop robust counterintelligence protocols to safeguard against espionage, insider threats and infiltration attempts.
4. Ethical Considerations and Human Rights:
   o Respect for Human Rights: Embedding principles of respect for human rights, privacy, and civil liberties into the agency’s operations would prevent abuses and uphold democratic values. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms could be a guiding document in this regard.
   o Ethical Guidelines: This new agency would need to develop ethical guidelines to govern intelligence operations, ensuring they align with national values. The GOC and its departments have seen a continuous recurrence of harassment and discrimination issues facing military, intelligence, and law enforcement entities. A new Foreign Intelligence Agency would need to consider all the lessons learned from these previous experiences to formulate a strategy to avoid similar problems moving forward.
5. Public Transparency and Accountability:
   o Transparency Measures: Balancing the need for secrecy with transparency by establishing mechanisms would ensure the public is informed about the agency’s general activities, without compromising sensitive operations. The GOC and the Canadian Intelligence Community have been more transparent regarding their concerns, issues, and accomplishments in recent past than ever before. The implementation of a new Foreign Intelligence Agency would allow for even more transparency on the concerns and issues the GOC is acting upon to maintain and enhance Canada’s security and prosperity.

o Accountability to Parliament/Congress: The agency would need to remain accountable to elected officials through regular reporting, parliamentary review, and oversight to maintain democratic control over intelligence activities. The national security advisor, various Ministers, as well as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, would be responsible for reporting to the GOC and the Prime Minister in this regard.

6. Training and Recruitment:
   o Professional Training: A new Foreign Intelligence Agency would need to invest in training programs to ensure personnel understand their roles, legal boundaries, and ethical responsibilities. This is no different from any other governmental organization—however, Canada is well-placed to pull from multiple agencies that comprise the Canadian Intelligence Community as well as our Five Eye partners. The inception of a Foreign Service would only benefit our allies’ Foreign Intelligence Agencies and Services focussed on threats to Western interests.
   o Selective Recruitment: As with any Agency or Service tasked with the collection and retention of classified and sensitive information, a Foreign Intelligence Agency would need to implement a rigorous selection process to recruit individuals with integrity, expertise, and cultural understanding—all necessary for effective intelligence gathering. As in the 1980s, The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was originally staffed with members from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Security Service. Members of CSIS ( A HUMINT collection Service) could help form a new Foreign Intelligence Agency with a separate but complimentary mandate. Canada has regularly shown it can be a major player on the world stage regarding intelligence collection. A foreign Agency would be another opportunity to demonstrate this.

As with any Government Agency or Service, the above-noted considerations aim to strike a balance between the imperative for robust intelligence capabilities and the need to protect civil liberties, maintain international relationships, and uphold democratic values—all while ensuring the agency’s effectiveness and accountability.

Time to Decide

The implementation of a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency is not something that should be taken lightly—by Canadians, or the Government of Canada. However, I hope that my explanation of terms and considerations provide you with a better understanding of the reasons why a Foreign Intelligence Agency for Canada has its advantages for future security and prosperity.

Regardless of which side of the debate you land on concerning a Foreign Intelligence Agency, Canada’s future security and prosperity will be affected by this decision going forward. By keeping up on the information available to you, and voicing your concerns to our political leaders you can be a part of the choices going forward.