Leave It to The Professionals
Having a mechanic who’s good at math doesn’t make them a certified professional accountant. You wouldn’t want them doing your financial planning, because they don’t have the education, training, or qualifications for the job.
So, what does this have to do with the world of Intelligence? Intelligence professionals are highly skilled, highly trained and have a long list of support teams and resources to assist them in conducting operations such as the collection and analysis of information.
You may be thinking, “Well, isn’t that ‘intelligence’—that is, information collected from someone is Human Intelligence or HUMINT, right?” But no, it’s not. Intelligence is the process and result of information that is collected, analyzed, verified, validated, corroborated, and then disseminated for the use of clients (typically governments) to make decisions related to national security or other important political, economic, or military matters.
At this point, you may be wondering why I’m going to such lengths to differentiate professionals from non-professionals, and information from intelligence.
Here’s why: the recent revelations made concerning Michael Spavor suing the Government of Canada regarding his detainment by the Chinese Government for over 1,000 days.
According to recent media articles such as this one in The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/20/canada-china-michael-spavor-spying
Michael Spavor is suing the Canadian Government because he was arrested for unwittingly providing “intelligence” about North Korea to fellow Canadian Michael Kovrig.
As you may recall, Kovrig was also arrested and detained by the Chinese Government for the same length of time as Spavor. Spavor alleges that Kovrig shared the information he gave Kovrig with Canada and Five Eyes allies.
To get a better understanding of the complexities of this situation, we need to go back to when Michael Kovrig worked as a Global Affairs Canada (GAC) Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) Officer from 2012 to 2014.
The GSRP is a department of Global Affairs Canada and has officers collect information (NOT intelligence) from “contacts” regarding matters that they feel will be of interest to the Government of Canada. Their collection has been described as “overt” and, as such, require no specific operational precautions that would normally be conducted by intelligence professionals before, during, and after meeting with a source of information.
On that note, “contacts” are not the same as sources. Sources in the Intelligence Community are highly sensitive and not disclosed—usually their identities are obfuscated with a codename and their real identities are not attributed to the information they provide. This is not the case for a contact, who is not hidden in reporting and easily attributed.
Spavor, a known contact of Kovrig, worked in China. He provided cultural exchange visits into North Korea, which allowed him access to, and interaction with, the North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un—a person that the Chinese Government most likely has political, economic, and potentially military interest in.
According to claims by the Chinese Government, Spavor “was supplying ‘intelligence’ to Kovrig,” and both men were “suspected of committing crimes endangering China’s national security.”
These accusations played nicely into the Chinese Government’s justifications for the two Michaels’ arbitrary arrests and detentions in 2018—which coincidently took place just after Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou had been detained in Canada, in connection to possible violations of trade sanctions on Iran.
In August 2021, Spavor was sentenced to 11 years of detention by a Chinese court. However, both Spavor and Kovrig were released in September 2021, when Meng Wanzhou reached a deal with US prosecutors and was released. (Again, timing is everything.)
So, the Michaels were released and Meng Wanzhou was allowed to return to China. And everyone is happy, right?
Not at all.
Spavor alleges that his discussions with Kovrig were being used to provide “intelligence” to Canada and the Five Eyes. This demonstrates a real problem with the way in which information is collected and then misinterpreted as intelligence.
Sensitive information for whom?
GSRP officers actively collect information from individuals who are willing and able to provide information that such officers believe will be of relevance and interest to the Canadian Government.
However, GAC is focused on political and economic subjects, which don’t fall entirely into the context of national security. National security is the wheelhouse of Canada’s HUMINT collection agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS, or the Service). This is especially the case when the Service works abroad.
Within Canada, the Service may come across information that is of relevance in a political or economic capacity and report it. Under Section 16 of the CSIS Act, the Service can collect Foreign Intelligence referring to information or intelligence about the “capabilities, intentions or activities” of a foreign state. However, this collection must take place in Canada and cannot be directed at citizens of Canada, permanent residents or Canadian companies.
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/JS71-1-2000E-4.pdf
So where does this leave the Government of Canada regarding collection of foreign intelligence outside of Canada?
Well, nowhere.
However, with the GSRP program not being “covert,” they can meet with individuals abroad; and if they have or are willing to provide information (not intelligence) regarding “capabilities, intentions or activities” of a foreign state—well, I guess it’s okay. But it’s NOT, and here’s why.
A foreign state that decides sensitive information is being collected against it, or on its soil, can justify that these “overt” meetings are—in reality—a threat to them. As referenced in the above-noted Guardian article, Spavor’s accusations against Kovrig gives the People Republic of China (PRC) perceived credibility to the claims that Kovrig and Spavor were “committing crimes endangering China’s national security.” Although these allegations are false, the GSRP is low-lying fruit for foreign states with less-than-stellar human rights records—emboldening such foreign states to go after and label individuals who have no actual intelligence credibility or ability to be rounded up and used in political hostage diplomacy.
In response to the Chinese Embassy’s comments, Global Affairs responded that the detention of the two Michaels was “unjust and unacceptable,” which is totally true. If two individuals discuss North Korean politics over beers, this is in no way, shape or form a justification for arbitrary detention or imprisonment. But could this not have been totally avoided if the right people were involved? If it was realized that any Government of Canada representative, discussing information that a host country believes is sensitive, should only be collected, recorded, and disseminated by a trained intelligence professional with the proper level of tradecraft being applied.
The Guardian article quotes Kerry Buck, former Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security, who calls the accusations against Kovrig as “ridiculous.” Buck goes on to say “GSRP diplomates write diplomatic reports. As with all diplomatic reports they are read by people in Ottawa, including the CSIS. Some of those reports provide information CSIS and others might like. In no world does this make GSRP diplomats ‘spies.’”
Let’s take a second to dissect that statement, shall we?
• The collection of information for the purpose of dissemination within the government—Okay, this does match some criteria for intelligence (see previous distinctions above). But where’s the analysis, validation, corroboration, verification … you know, added value? This is not intelligence.
• As for the term “CSIS and others might like”—The only reason any government agency “might like” certain reporting is because it fits into their mandate. CSIS’s mandate relates to national security issues, to provide advice to the Government of Canada on these issues.
The GSRP cannot hide behind a thin veil of overt diplomatic reporting if its actions can be used by foreign states to endanger the freedom of Canadians abroad. This includes their own officers. Their actions do not discount the fact that a hostile foreign government will capitalize on their actions being deemed as the collection of sensitive economic, political, or military information.
Kovrig’s arrest happened sometime after he left the GSRP and Global Affairs Canada. Any contact and reporting between the two Michaels likely occurred well before their arrest and detention. This demonstrates that the PRC’s decision to arrest and detain both Kovrig and Spavor was in line with using them as pressure points against Canada regarding Meng Wanzhou’s detention. This highlights the potential jeopardy that the GSRP can cause in the way they collect and share information in diplomatic reports.
This could easily turn into a larger issue if foreign states misinterpret the “overt” collection of information as an excuse to hide in plain sight and collect sensitive information (in their consideration, or for political reasons) from their citizens by Canadian Government officials. This could lead to further detentions of Canadians, further scrutiny on activities of Canadians abroad, and may result in a foreign state trying to discredit Canada on the political world stage.
Canada’s reluctance to allow collection of sensitive political, economic, and military information abroad—specifically, by trained and resourced intelligence professionals—will result in the job being done by those who are untrained. This will continue to risk the reputation of the Canadian Intelligence Community, not to mention the reputation of Canada and Canadians from arbitrary detention abroad.
Where do we go from here?
Stephanie Carvin, a professor of international relations at Carleton University, is quoted in the Guardian article: “China’s detention of the Michaels was arbitrary and it was wrong. But it also highlights the consequences of Canada’s indecision of whether or not it wants to have a foreign human intelligence agency.” Carvin’s point is valid—and is one that has been debated within the Government of Canada and the Intelligence Community for some time.
Should CSIS be given the powers to collect information relating to economic, political, and military interests and capabilities of foreign states outside of Canada? Well, that is where the information is!
Many would argue that this goes hand-in-hand with CSIS’s mandate to protect Canada and Canadians against national security threats. Is the military capacity of a foreign state hostile to Canada a national security issue? Is the economic collapse of one of Canada’s industries, caused by a foreign state, a threat to Canada and Canadians? Is the political ousting of Canada from a major world power collaboration on intelligence sharing a threat to Canada and Canadians?
As we have seen on issues relating to foreign interference, Canada’s ability to identify and deal with threats from foreign nations is not adequately dealt with on Canadian soil. Finding out about which countries are trying to infiltrate our political and democratic institutions for their own purposes—or which countries are attempting to assassinate Canadians on Canadian soil—starts with collection abroad and should not be left to diplomats who are untrained and unaware of the operational situations and considerations in that country.
As I have hopefully demonstrated—regardless of whether Canada sees the discussion of economic, political, or military information collection by the GSRP officers and others as “spying”—it is foreign governments who will make this determination. Moreover, only highly skilled, highly trained intelligence professionals have a chance of performing this kind of work without the potential political blowback—including danger to sources, sensitive information or operations keeping Canada economically and politically relevant on the world stage.
