How OPSEC May Have Exposed Indian Agents in Canadian Murder Case
OPSEC, or Operational Security, is a term used by the International Intelligence Community regarding the process in which any information relating to an Intelligence Operation needs to be kept secure ensuring the information does not identify the actions or motives of the parties involved, nor compromise the clandestine nature of the operation.
On September 21, 2023, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation reported that Intelligence from electronic as well as human sources had been collected by the Canadian government in the investigation of the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar.
This information has led the Canadian Prime Minister to allege that the Indian Government was involved in Mr. Nijjar’s murder—and more specifically, that agents of the Indian Government were involved.
In this article, I will look at:
• The open-source information (aka information reported in/by the media) relating to the murder of Mr. Nijjar, from the perspective of allegations made by the Canadian Government; and
• How lapses in OPSEC may have played a role in identifying the connection between Nijjar’s murder and the Indian Government.
The information provided below is based on speculation from my training and experience as a law enforcement officer and Intelligence Officer for over more than two decades. During that time, I worked both domestically and internationally on highly sensitive national security operations. Hence, my comments are based on my perceptions of what may have occurred—they are not a representation of the actions of the Five Eyes or Canadian Intelligence Community.
With that disclaimer out of the way, let’s dive in …
OPSEC in a nutshell
Intelligence Operations range from domestic interviews of persons of interest, to national security investigations, to assassinations of heads of state (e.g., Mossad Wrath of God assassinations against members of the terrorist group Black September).
Every Intelligence Operation has several moving parts that must be completed before the next stage of the operation begins and the overall goal is accomplished. Unfortunately, the surrounding actions needed to initiate, maintain, and complete the operation are all susceptible to the risk of compromise.
One of the biggest risks to a clandestine operation is exposure —where the parties involved are linked back to the individuals, intelligence agency, government and the country involved.
The political blowback from an intelligence operation that involves an assassination can have serious political, national security and economic repercussions for that country. This has been exemplified by the expulsion of both Canadian and Indian diplomats from Canada and India, the refusal of India to provide visas for travel from Canada, as well as the increased tensions that have arisen between the two countries since allegations were made.
So, what OPSEC considerations could have led to the identification of the involvement of the Indian Government? Below, I list four key considerations: Communications, Human sources, Conveyances, and Travel.
Communications
Communication between agents, sources, assets, and their handlers can be a huge risk to OPSEC. The higher the political risk surrounding the operation, the more clandestine the means of communications needs to be.
For this reason, many intelligence agencies will try to keep communication with agents minimal and set up dates, times, and places to meet and communicate in person. However, in the early stages of agent recruitment, elicitation and management, communication via phone, text or social media application may be required. All of this leaves a digital trail that can be traced.
Based on what media reports have shared, it can be assumed that such communications between the Indian Foreign Intelligence Service RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) may have been intercepted by either a domestic Intelligence Service (e.g., RCMP National Security, CSIS or CSE) or one of the Five Eyes partners. Additionally, the intercepted communications were likely between representatives of the Indian Government (located abroad) and RAW intelligence officers involved in orchestrating the murder of Mr. Nijjar.
This potential compromise may have come from several sources, including the electronic interception of conversations or the interception of signals intelligence or SIGINT.
Given the far-reaching implications of this type of international communications, it is highly likely that a Five Eye member intercepted the SIGINT and shared that information among the other Five Eye partners—including the Canadian Intelligence Community.
Human Sources
As referenced in open-source reporting, HUMINT (aka Human Intelligence) also played a role in identifying Indian government officials’ involvement in the murder of Mr. Nijjar.
Mr. Nijjar and several groups and individuals associated with the Khalistan independence movement have been labelled terrorist by the Indian Government. Nijjar was listed on the India Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, or UAPA, as a member of a terrorist group. In 2020, he was also accused by the Indian National Investigation Agency of “trying to radicalize the Sikh community across the world in favor of the creation of ‘Khalistan.’”
As such, it is fair to say that Mr. Nijjar was a known commodity within the Indian Intelligence Community—and RAW intelligence officers operating in Canada would have solicited information from Canadian-based contacts and potential Human Sources in this regard.
Individuals who had been contacted by RAW to provide information or potentially assist in this operation may have been unwilling to help, or they could have shared this information with others. This potential compromise to the operation would have resulted in the provision of information to Canadian law enforcement or Intelligence agencies.
Consequently, a human source could have been re directed back against RAW agents to continue to provide more information on RAW intentions and actions. This would have provided Canadian law enforcement or intelligence agencies an intricate piece of the puzzle surrounding the murder of Mr. Nijjar. As not all India diaspora living in Canada would agree with the findings, and concerns of the Indian Government concerning a separate nation of Khalistan, it is likely that the human source was from the Canadian Indian community.
Conveyances
Photo of the vehicle identified in the murder of Mr. Nijjar, provided by Vancouver Police at a news conference on August 16, 2023
Whether going to, coming from, or participating in operational activities, conveyances can pose a risk to OPSEC. With the advent of closed-circuit cameras in many populated areas, a vehicle used for clandestine purposes in operational activities can be identified, its routing mapped, and a timeline created. Then there is also the potential of identifying the vehicle’s occupants. All these things add up to potential jeopardy for an Intelligence operation.
I previously mentioned the Mossad operation, Wrath of God. After the wrongful assassination of Ahmed Bouchikhi—who was mistaken for a Mossad target and Black October member Ali Hassan Salameh—some members of the Mossad team were arrested after attempting to return the rental car they used as a getaway car following their hit on Bouchikhi.
Any conveyance used in operational activity has the potential to compromise existing operations—as well as future ones.
I am sure that any 2008 Silver Toyota Camrys driving around British Columbia are attracting more attention than usual. Law enforcement and Intelligence agencies are likely doing their due diligence to identify the owners of this make, model and year of vehicle, in the hopes doing so will lead to further insights into Mr. Nijjar’s murder.
Travel
Finally, the requirement of travel to conduct operations abroad is another potential pitfall of operational activity. I personally have had to assume multiple false scenarios for travelling to conduct operations internationally—all while knowing that if my operation was compromised, I could face detention, jail time, physical harm or worse.
Operations do not happen in a bubble—agents need to be trained, provided equipment, briefed, and debriefed. This requires the work of many hands and may result in the agent’s requirement to meet more than just their handler to perform their duties. If the Indian Government enlisted the assistance of agents in Canada, it’s possible that the travel of clandestine Intelligence Officers from RAW occurred prior to the assassination of Mr. Nijjar to help orchestrate the hit.
As such, members of the Indian Government may have used the false cover of tourism, visiting family or some other covert reason to enter the country and set up the necessary meetings—or provide the necessary logistics to assist in the operation that ultimately resulted in the death of Mr. Nijjar.
Conclusion
As previously stated, the thoughts and opinions in this article are my own and based on my previous experience, training and research as a former Intelligence Officer.
Above, I presented potential scenarios which may have helped Canadian law enforcement / Intelligence agencies— as well as Five Eye members—paint a more fulsome picture of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Mr. Nijjar.
That said, all Operational Activity comes with risk—and there is no OPSEC without some potential jeopardy of compromising the clandestine nature of the work.
In this case of an assassination of a Canadian—on Canadian soil — I am hopeful that all the intelligence and evidence gathered will eventually provide a clear and indisputable picture of what actually happened. Only then can the true accomplices to this crime be held accountable.
