When “Plausible Deniability” isn’t Plausible or Deniable

This week, former Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officer William Majcher had a bail hearing in the province of Quebec in relation to foreign interference charges against him.

Majcher was arrested in Vancouver on July 20. According to open-source media, he is charged under the Security of Information Act for his involvement—supposedly occurring between 2014 and 2019—in “Preparatory acts for the benefit of a foreign entity and conspiracy.” A second former RCMP officer, Kenneth (aka Kim) Marsh has been named as a co-conspirator but is yet to be charged.

Both Majcher and Marsh have identified they worked in undercover operations in various money laundering and drug investigations:

• Marsh, who retired from the RCMP in 1999, is now working as a Private Investigator in British Columbia.

• Majcher, who retired in 2007, works as a self-proclaimed “hired gun” as a founding member of the EMIDR company located in Hong Kong. EMIDR—which stands for Evaluate, Monitor, Investigate, Deter, Recover—was established in 2016 and proports itself a “specialized corporate risk advisory firm” that provides services in “asset recovery and cyber security, financial crime, money laundering and tax evasion.”

The allegations against Majcher and Marsh involve targeting of an individual for intimidation on Canadian soil. It has been speculated that both men may have been involved in these activities and used their knowledge and contacts to obtain intelligence information and services for the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Given the current hot-button topic of Foreign Interference that’s been recently dominating the news and overshadowing all activities within the Canadian Intelligence Community and Canadian Parliament, the puzzling question arises:

How did two former law enforcement officers once associated with the Federal Government of Canada become entangled with the PRC—and possibly even serve as instruments for intelligence gathering on their behalf?

Let’s take a deeper dive to explore the how and why.

Project Dragon
To gain a better understanding of this situation and how it all came to be, we need to go back to 2019.

When operation “Project Dragon” was being used to reclaim money that was allegedly being siphoned out of China to other countries, including Canada.

In 2019, during an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Majcher was asked directly if he was working for the Chinese Government. His answer was both aloof and cagey: “I have a commercial relationship with entities that are in themselves associated in some form or another with policing authorities in China.”

If this answer sounds non-committal, that’s because it is!

Operation Fox Hunt
In August 2021, the Public Safety Canada website published an unclassified document entitled “Foreign Interference and Hostile Activities of State Actors.” https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/trnsprnc/brfng-mtrls/prlmntry-bndrs/20210625/08-en.aspx This publication notes that Operation Fox Hunt is a PRC program that targets allegedly corrupt Chinese nationals who are living abroad, including in Canada.

This operation has been ongoing in Canada since 2014 (the same year that MAJCHER was allegedly first involved in the actions under which he is being charged).

It is widely believed that Operation Fox Hunt was also used to suppress criticism of the Chinese regime, and that tactics used in this operation include threatening and intimidating individuals and their relatives in Canada or abroad.

Unfortunately, the program could have the dual use of targeting individuals involved in corruption but can also be used to silence dissent and pressure political opponents.

Chinese Community centres and Illegal police activity
Fast-forward to 2022 and 2023, when concerns surrounding Chinese interference came to a head in Canada. RCMP began investigations against alleged Chinese-based “police station” community centres in Canada. The National Security and Intelligence advisor to the Prime Minister, Jody Thomas, stated that “’There would be value in our ability to arrest people for them and those investigations are underway by the RCMP.’” https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/rcmp-chinese-police-stations-1.6862336

The RCMP investigations into illegal police activity at Chinese community centres, likely provided even more insight into the activities of Marsh and Majcher.

So, the question remains: did Marsh and Majcher knowingly assist the PRC in foreign interference, by using Canadian contacts and their knowledge to obtain information in Canada against the Chinese diaspora and Canadian citizens?

The answer will likely come out during the upcoming trial(s).

Witting vs Unwitting Sources
In the Intelligence Community at large, collection of information can be conducted via “witting” as well as “unwitting” sources:

• Essentially, a witting source is aware of who the information they are collecting is going to.

• However, an unwitting source is unaware. They may be under the impression that they are obtaining information for a survey company, a think tank, or even another country’s intelligence or law enforcement organization. This is typically referred to as a “false flag” operation. The reasons for maintaining a cover with an unwitting source are varied, but generally it is because the source would be unwilling to assist or provide such information if they were aware of who the actual consumer/recipient of the information is.

So, what were Majcher and Marsh—witting, or unwitting?

Under the auspice of identifying corrupt individuals of Chinese nationality who have siphoned funds from China, Majcher and Marsh may have been unaware they were collecting information on individuals of interest to the Chinese Government regarding dissent or anti regime sentiment. Thus, unwitting regarding the actual intent of the client, but witting in regard to who the client (the PRC) was and potentially how the information could be used. It is difficult to conceive that two veterans of undercover law enforcement work were unaware their actions could be used outside of the agreed-upon terms of investigation.

When “Project Dragon” became “Operation Fox Hunt” there was potential for many red flags (no pun intended). This also goes back to Majcher’s responses relating to who he was working for in 2019 under Project Dragon.

A more likely scenario is that Majcher and Marsh were willfully blind to the facts surrounding the work that they were doing—and essentially negligent in their responsibilities to ensure that who they were working for, and what they were working on, was not being used by their client “entity” in a way that was a contravention to Canadian law.

Implications for Commercial investigation and security community

Hostile Intelligence Services and enemy states will continue to use former law enforcement officers and private investigators as go-betweens, cut outs or proxies. This highlights another means of sophistication in collecting information against Canadian companies, intellectual property and to suppress the actions of former nationals. The reason is simple—Canadian Security and Investigation professionals are less likely to draw attention to their actions and using the above-mentioned cover of “plausible deniability”, Hostile Intelligence Services could continue to gain access without suspicion.

The current situation surrounding Majcher and Marsh should therefore be a cautionary tale for those in the commercial investigative or security community. By keeping your wits about you, you won’t end up an unwitting tool for a foreign government.

I have been a licensed Private Investigator (PI) for many years—first starting out as a PI in college when I worked as a security officer for a major retail and pharmacy outlet. At that time, I was mainly responsible for store loss and theft and the thought of being involved in a foreign interference operation with a hostile intelligence service was inconceivable.

That said, over the years I’ve become fully aware that many former law enforcement officers— and those seeking a career in law enforcement or security and intelligence work—may also be working as Private Investigators and could be targets for this kind of sophisticated operation.

Many companies and individuals working in this industry are aware of the KYC philosophy. The idea of Know Your Client is like the financial industry’s “Know Your Customer,” but stems from the concern that as a PI, you may be used as a proxy for individuals, companies, groups, or governments that are working against the interests and laws of the country / province under which you are licensed.

For Risk assessment, Private Investigation or “hired gun” companies or individuals with the authority to conduct investigations, it is paramount that due diligence regarding clients is conducted prior to taking on the work. When concerns arise, they need to be voiced. The RCMP and Canadian Security Intelligence Service have hotlines and emails that can be contacted at any time. In relation to the client privilege issue, the choice is clear—a paycheque isn’t worth a jail sentence. When discussing concerns over a client, or where information provided to that client, is going or how it is being used, the commercial investigation and security community have a duty to remove themselves from the situation and report the potential issue to the proper authorities.